Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T15:59:30.103Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Evaluation of Statistical Hypotheses Using Information Transmitted

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

James G. Greeno
James G. Greeno*
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The main argument of this paper is that an evaluation of the overall explanatory power of a theory is less problematic and more relevant as an assessment of the state of knowledge than evaluation of statistical explanations of single occurrences in terms of likelihoods that are assigned to explananda.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , June 1970 , pp. 279 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1] Emmerich, D. S. and Greeno, J. G., “Some Decision Factors in Scientific Investigation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 33, 1966, pp. 262–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Hempel, C. G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Appleton-Century Crofts, New York, 1967.Google Scholar
[3] Kullback, S., Information Theory and Statistics, John Wiley, New York, 1959.Google Scholar
[4] Salmon, W. C., “Deductive and Inductive Explanation,” Duplicated Paper, August, 1964.Google Scholar
[5] Scriven, M., “Explanations, Predictions, and Laws,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III (eds. Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 170–230.Google Scholar