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Empirical Adequacy in the Received View

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sebastian Lutz
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Abstract

I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories involving constants or functions from observable to unobservable objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informativeness’ in Constructive Empiricism.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 5 , December 2014 , pp. 1171 - 1183
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Early versions of this article have been presented at the Lunch Talk of the Theoretical Philosophy Unit at Utrecht University and at the PhDs in Logic conference at Ghent University in 2009. I thank the audiences, the audience at the Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Albert Visser, Thomas Müller, and F. A. Muller for helpful discussions. Research for this article was in part supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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