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Eliminating Mistakes about Eliminative Materialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert K. Shope
Robert K. Shope*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Boston
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Abstract

Richard Rorty's eliminative materialism is an attack on dualism that has frequently been misrepresented and incorrectly criticized. By taking account of the mistakes that philosophers have made concerning eliminative materialism, a proper definition of the doctrine and a clarification of its relation to traditional materialism will emerge, as well as an understanding of its true strengths and weaknesses. The discussion centers around the original manner in which Rorty defended eliminative materialism by means of analogies to the elimination of talk about demons and talk about macroscopic physical objects.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 1979 , pp. 590 - 612
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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