Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Ecologists typically invoke “law-like” generalizations, ranging over “structural” and/or “functional” kinds, in order to explain generalizations about “historical” kinds (such as biological taxa)—rather than vice versa. This practice is justified, since structural and functional kinds tend to correlate better with important ecological phenomena than do historical kinds. I support these contentions with three recent case studies. In one sense, therefore, ecology is, and should be, more nomothetic, or law-oriented, than idiographic, or historically oriented. This conclusion challenges several recent philosophical claims about the nature of ecological science.
For feedback on the ideas expressed herein, I thank Mark Colyvan, Paul Harcombe, John Huss, Jeff Mikkelson, and audiences at the 2001 meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology; at Trent University; and at the 2002 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Thanks to Kelly Bailly for tracking down the laws cited by Darwin (1859).