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Discussion: Why The New Theory of Reference Does Not Entail Absolute Time and Space

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert Rynasiewicz
Robert Rynasiewicz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University
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Extract

I explain why the New Theory of Reference of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others does not entail absolute time and space, contrary to what Quentin Smith has recently claimed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 508 - 509
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA.

References

Kripke, S. (1972), “Naming and Necessity”, in Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 253–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Q. (1991), “The New Theory of Reference Entails Absolute Time and Space”, Philosophy of Science 58: 411–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar