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Discussion: Getting The Constraints on Popper's Probability Functions Right

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Hugues Leblanc  and
Peter Roeper
Hugues Leblanc
Affiliation:
Département de Philosophie, Université du Québec à Montréal
Peter Roeper
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Australian National University
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Abstract

Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in “Probability and Conditionals” (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendali (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 151 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

Hugues Leblanc held a Grant in Aid of Research from Temple University while this paper was written.

‡

Send reprint requests to the authors, Département de Philosophie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal (Québec), H3C 3P8, Canada.

References

Bendali, K. (1979), “Belief-Theoretic Formal Semantics for First-Order Logic and Probability”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 375–397.Google Scholar
Harper, W. L.; Leblanc, H.; and van Fraassen, B. C. (1983), Essays in Epistemology and Semantics. New York: Haven Publications.Google Scholar
Leblanc, H. (1982), “Popper's 1955 Axiomatization of Absolute Probability”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63: 133–145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leblanc, H. and Roeper, P. (1992), “Probability Functions: The Matter of Their Recursive Definability”, Philosophy of Science 59: 372–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. (1970), “Probability and Conditionals”, Philosophy of Science 37: 64–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar