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Discussion: Analogies as Generalizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Joseph Agassi
Joseph Agassi*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
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Abstract

Analogies have been traditionally recognized as a proper part of inductive procedures, akin to generalizations. Seldom, however, have they been presented as superior to generalizations, in the attainability of a higher degree of certitude for their conclusions or in other respects. Though Bacon definitely preferred analogy to generalization, the tradition seems to me to go the other way—until the recent publication of works by Mary B. Hesse (pp. 21-28 and passim) and, perhaps, R. Harré (pp. 23-28 and passim).

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , October 1964 , pp. 351 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © 1964 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Harre, R. Theories and Things, London and N. Y., 1961.Google Scholar
[2] Hesse, Mary B. Forces and Fields, Nelsons, 1961.Google Scholar
[3] Popper, K. R. ‘On Carnap's version of Laplace's rule of Succession', Mind, LXXI, 1962.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Popper, K. R. ‘The Demarcation of Science', P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Opencourt, La Salle, 1963.Google Scholar
[5] Popper, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations.Google Scholar
[6] Popper, K. R. Logic of Scientific Discovery, relevant new appendices.Google Scholar