Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-03T19:51:59.906Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Disclosure and Information Transfer in Signaling Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Justin P. Bruner
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are possible when the interests of those involved conflict. Perfect information transfer seems inevitable if there are physical constraints, which limit the signal repertoire of an individual, effectively making bluffing an impossibility. This, I argue, is incorrect. Unfakeable signals by no means guarantee information transfer. I demonstrate the existence of a so-called pooling equilibrium and discuss why the traditional argument for perfect information transfer (Frank’s full disclosure principle) does not hold in all cases. Additionally, I demonstrate that deception is possible at equilibrium despite the fact that signals are impossible to fake.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 649 - 666
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

Thanks to Kim Sterelny, Brian Skyrms, Simon Huttegger, Hannah Rubin, Luke Holman, Ben Fraser, and Chris Hunter-Lean for feedback and encouragement. I would also like to thank the participants of the New Zealand Association for Philosophy 2014 in Christchurch, the participants of the Social Dynamics Seminar at University of California, Irvine, and two anonymous referees. I am especially grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee who helped me better understand the relationship between indices and the notion of certification in economics.

References

Akerlof, G. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradbury, J. W., and Vehrencamp, S. L.. 1998. Principles of Animal Communication. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer.Google Scholar
Bruner, J., O’Connor, C., Rubin, H., and Huttegger, S.. 2014. “David Lewis in the Lab: Experimental Results on the Emergence of Meaning.” Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0535-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V., and Sobel, J.. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50:1431–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, N., and Halliday, T.. 1978. “Deep Croaks and Fighting Assessment in Toads Bufo bufo.” Nature 274:683–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawkins, R., and Krebs, J.. 1984. “Animal Signals: Mind-Reading and Manipulation.” In Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, 2nd ed, ed. J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, 380–402. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer.Google Scholar
Frank, R. 1988. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Fraser, B. 2012. “Costly Signalling Theories: Beyond the Handicap Principle.” Biology and Philosophy 27:263–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, P. 2011. Review of Signals: Evolution, Learning and Information, by Brian Skyrms. Mind 120:1288–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grafen, A. 1990. “Biological Signals as Handicaps.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 144:517–46.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Grose, J. 2011. “Modelling the Fall and Rise of the Handicap Principle.” Biology and Philosophy 26:677–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, S. 1981. “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality.” Journal of Law and Economics 24 (3): 461–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guilford, T., and Dawkins, M.. 1991. “Receiver Psychology and the Evolution of Animal Signals.” Animal Behavior 42:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofbauer, J., and Huttegger, S.. 2008. “Feasibility of Communication in Binary Signaling Games.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 254:843–49.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K.. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurd, P. 1995. “Communication in Discrete Action-Response Games.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 174 (2): 217–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurd, P., and Enquist, M.. 2005. “A Strategic Taxonomy of Biological Communication.” Animal Behavior 70:1155–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huttegger, S. 2007. “Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning.” Philosophy of Science 74:1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huttegger, S., Bruner, J., and Zollman, K.. 2015. “The Handicap Principle Is an Artifact.” Philosophy of Science 82 (5), forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jovanovic, B. 1982. “Truthful Disclosure of Information.” Bell Journal of Economics 13:36–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Martinez, M. 2015. “Deception in Sender-Receiver Games.” Erkenntnis 80:215–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, J., and Harper, D. G. C.. 2003. Animal Signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McWhirter, G. 2015. “Deception and Formal Models of Communication.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axv001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milgrom, P. 1981. “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications.” Bell Journal of Economics 12:380–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pawlowitsch, C. 2008. “Why Evolution Does Not Always Lead to an Optimal Signaling System.” Games and Economic Behavior 63:203–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pruden, A., and Uetz, G.. 2004. “Assessment of Potential Predation Costs of Male Courtship Displays in Wolf Spiders Using Video Digitilization and Playback.” Journal of Insect Behavior 17:67–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryan, M., and Cummings, M.. 2005. “Animal Signals and the Overlooked Costs of Efficacy.” Evolution 59:1160–61.Google Scholar
Searcy, W., and Nowicki, S.. 2005. The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Skyrms, B. 1996. The Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, B. 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning and Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spence, M. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:355–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, P., Hasson, O., and Clark, D.. 2000. “Body Postures and Patterns as Amplifiers of Physical Condition.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 267:917–22.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Taylor, P., and Jonker, L.. 1978. “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40:145–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, W. 1978. “A Note on ‘Lemons’ Markets with Quality Certification.” Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1): 277–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zahavi, A. 1975. “Mate Selection: A Selection for a Handicap.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 53:205–14.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Zollman, K. 2013. “Finding Alternatives to the Handicap Principle.” Biological Theory 8:127–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar