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Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kevin C. Elliott
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Abstract

Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 303 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Michael Dickson, Heather Douglas, Ann Johnson, Daniel McKaughan, Daniel Steel, Torsten Wilholt, and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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