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The Development of Russell's Structural Postulates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael P. Bradie
Michael P. Bradie*
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University
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Abstract

From 1914 on Russell's epistemology was dominated by the attempt to show how we come by our knowledge of the external world. As he gradually became aware of the inadequacies of the “pure empiricist” approach, Russell realized that his program was viable only insofar as certain postulates of inference were allowed. In this paper I trace the development of the structural postulates from Analysis of Matter to Human Knowledge. The basic continuity of Russell's thought is established. Certain confusions implicit in the various formulations of the postulates are brought to light. Finally, it is argued that the viability of Russell's program rests on a larger number of independent postulates than he thought were needed. Some implications of Russell's work for current work in the philosophy of science are briefly sketched.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 441 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This research was supported, in part, by a research grant from the Faculty Research Committee of Bowling Green State University. The paper was revised during tenure of a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship-in-Residence. I want to thank David Lewis for some helpful comments and suggestions.

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