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Determinism, Laws, and Predictability in Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Richard Boyd
Richard Boyd*
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Abstract

This paper examines commonly offered arguments to show that human behavior is not deterministic because it is not predictable. These arguments turn out to rest on the assumption that deterministic systems must be governed by deterministic laws, and that these give rise to predictability “in principle” of determined events. A positive account of determinism is advanced and it is shown that neither of these assumptions is true. The relation between determinism, laws, and prediction in practice is discussed as a question in scientific epistemology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 1972 , pp. 431 - 450
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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