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Credence in the Image of Chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael Caie
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Abstract

In this article, I consider what sorts of chance credence norms can be justified by appeal to the idea that ideal credences should line up with the chances. I argue that the Principal Principle cannot be so justified but that an alternative norm, the Temporal Principle—which maintains that an agent’s credence in a proposition ϕ, conditional on the temporal proposition that says that the chance of ϕ is x, should be x—can be so justified.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 626 - 648
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Richard Pettigrew for helpful correspondence on this material and to the anonymous referees at Philosophy of Science.

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