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Counterfactuals and the Past Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mathias Frisch
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Abstract

Albert (2000) provides a sketch of an entropy account of the causal and counterfactual asymmetries. This paper critically examines a proposal that may be thought to fill in some of the lacunae in Albert's account.

Type
Topics in Philosophy of Physics
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 739 - 750
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Albert, David Z. (2000), Time and Chance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Frisch, Mathias (2005), Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frisch, Mathias (forthcoming), “Causation, Counterfactuals and the Past-Hypothesis”, in Price, Huw and Corry, Richard (eds.), Russell’s Republic: The Place of Causation in the Constitution of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, David (1986), “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”, in Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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