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The Constructible and the Intelligible in Newton's Philosophy of Geometry
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In the preface to the Principia (1687) Newton famously states that “geometry is founded on mechanical practice.” Several commentators have taken this and similar remarks as an indication that Newton was firmly situated in the constructivist tradition of geometry that was prevalent in the seventeenth century. By drawing on a selection of Newton's unpublished texts, I hope to show the faults of such an interpretation. In these texts, Newton not only rejects the constructivism that took its birth in Descartes's Géométrie (1637); he also presents the science of geometry as being more powerful than his Principia remarks may lead us to believe.
- Type
- History of Philosophy of Science
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1114 - 1124
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
My thanks to Michael Friedman for very helpful comments on different versions of this paper.
References
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