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Consensus, Dissensus, and Democracy: What Is at Stake in Feminist Science Studies?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
If feminists argue for the irreducibility of the social dimensions of science, then they ought to embrace the idea that feminist and non-feminist scientists are not in collaboration, but in fact defend different interests. Instead, however, contemporary feminist science studies literature argues that feminist research improves particular, existing scientific enterprises, both epistemically (truer claims) and politically (more democratic methodologies and applications). I argue that the concepts of empirical success and democracy at work in this literature from Longino (1994) and Harding (1996), to Longino (2002), Gilbert and Rader (2001), and Keller (2001) are not sufficiently critical, and fail to do justice to the truly revolutionary work done by feminist scientists. I offer the beginnings of an epistemology of dissensus (as opposed to consensus), using the work of Haraway (1978), Lyotard (1984, 1998), and Ziarek (2001). How would such an epistemology relate to feminist discussions of the possibility of democratic, responsible knowledge?
- Type
- Gender and Science
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 989 - 1000
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
This article is the result of my three years of as “science” reviewer for The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory. I am grateful to the editor, Martin McQuillan, for the opportunity. I here develop some of the ideas which originated in my contribution to volume 12 of that journal.
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