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Communication in Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Philip Chapin Jones
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Extract

In the ultimate analysis, all philosophical differences are verbal. If by some intellectual X-Ray we could see into the minds of others, and perceive the exact nature of their concepts, we should be force to concede the correctness of their conclusions. The only alternative is that the mental processes—the laws of thought—differ from individual to individual.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , April 1947 , pp. 164 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1947

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References

1 Isaiah, 33:11.

2 No references are given for any quotations of this type because in the first place the source is irrelevant, and in the second place, equivalent quotations could be taken from almost any philosophical writings, and to name one particular writer would incorrectly single him out as the author of ambiguous sentences.

3 Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Book 1, First Section (p. 260, Max Muller's translation).

4 Bertrand Russell: An Inquiry into Meaning & Truth, W. W. Norton, 1940, p. 15.