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Causation and the Problem of Disagreement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Enno Fischer
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Abstract

This article presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes, and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults.

Type
Causation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 773 - 783
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful for helpful comments from and discussions with Thomas Blanchard, Hasok Chang, Mathias Frisch, Christopher Hitchcock, David Hopf, and Tammo Lossau. This research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation), project 254954344/GRK2073.

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