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A Case for “Qualitative Confirmation” for the Social and Behavioral Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Steven I. Miller  and
Marcel Fredericks
Steven I. Miller*
Affiliation:
School of Education Loyola University of Chicago
Marcel Fredericks
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology and Anthropology Loyola University of Chicago
*
†Send reprint requests to the authors, School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago, 820 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611.
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Abstract

This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and significance of “qualitative confirmation”. The need to do so is related to the fact that, without such a conceptualization, a large portion of the human sciences are relegated to a less than scientific status. Accordingly, “qualitative confirmation” is viewed as a proper subset of traditional confirmation theory. To establish such a case, a general Hempelian framework is utilized, but it is supplemented with two additional levels of confirmation. It is concluded that the final test for adequacy of such confirmation must rest on a subjective probability notion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 452 - 467
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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