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A Case for Old-Fashioned Observability, and a Reconstructed Constructive Empiricism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Hasok Chang
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Abstract

I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: A quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiricist distinction between observations and their interpretations, but without a presumption that observations are infallible. Using this concept of observability, I also propose a re-formulation of constructive empiricism that is easier to defend against realist attacks, while open to reasonable realist intuitions.

Type
Observation and Experiment
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 876 - 887
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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