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Boyle's Metaphysic of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

J. H. Kultgen
J. H. Kultgen*
Affiliation:
Oregon State College
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Extract

Robert Boyle's corpuscular philosophy was an important instance in the history of thought of a use of metaphysical principles in formulating new methods for physical science. Since Boyle nowhere completely and explicitly discussed his metaphysic, I shall undertake to reconstruct it and trace its influence on his scientific work.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , April 1956 , pp. 136 - 141
Copyright
Copyright © 1956, The Williams & Wilkins Company

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Footnotes

∗

Published with the approval of the Monographs Publication Committee, Oregon State College, as Research Paper No. 280, Lower Division of Liberal Arts, Department of Philosophy.

References

1 I will indicate by Roman numerals the volumes of Boyle's Works (ed. Thomas Birch; 6 vols.; London, 1772) and by “SC” The Sceptical Chymist (Everyman, 1911).

2 Boyle's arguments for God are all a posteriori and he makes no attempt (like Spinoza and Leibniz) to use the concept of God as an a priori reason for the multiplicity of substances. (Cf. esp. V, 132)

3 Historically, the fact that Boyle interpreted “form” geometrically (III, 28; V, 177) was a fundamental departure from the peripatetic tradition.

4 Of course, in every case with qualities, the correlation assumes as given a “well ordered” perceiving mind. (SC 176; III, 13)

5 This is true even of those corpuscles which are too small to be perceived. (IV, 71) Our sense organs are too gross for them to induce the motions necessary for perception. They are not, however, different in kind from larger bodies.