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Biological Species as Natural Kinds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David B. Kitts  and
David J. Kitts
David B. Kitts
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma
David J. Kitts
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Abstract

The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural kind status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 1979 , pp. 613 - 622
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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Footnotes

†

We have benefited from David Hull's response to an earlier and quite different version of this paper. We should like to thank Sabetai Unguru, Chris Swoyer and Kenneth Taylor—all of whom offered valuable suggestions for the improvement of the paper which we attempted to incorporate into the final version. It must not be supposed, of course, that they would now subscribe to everything we have said.

References

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