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The Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Christian Loew
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Abstract

A certain type of counterfactual is thought to be intimately related to causation, control, and explanation. The time asymmetry of these phenomena therefore plausibly arises from a time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. But why is counterfactual dependence time asymmetric? The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is David Albert’s account, which posits a new, time-asymmetric fundamental physical law, the so-called past hypothesis. Albert argues that the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence arises from holding fixed the past hypothesis when evaluating counterfactuals. In this article, I argue that Albert’s account misconstrues the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 436 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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