Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (i) that psychological states are individuated by their causal powers, and (ii) that causal powers supervene upon intrinsic physiological state. I distinguish two interpretations of individualism—the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘alternative‘—each of which is consistent with these motivating principles. I argue that the alternative interpretation is legitimately individualistic on the grounds that it accurately reflects the actual taxonomic practices of bona fide individualistic sciences. The classification of homeobox genes in developmental genetics provides an illustration. When applied to the taxonomy of psychological kinds, alternative individualism has some surprising consequences. In particular, externalist taxonomies of thought are consistent with the alternative interpretation, and hence consistent with individualism. I conclude, on this basis, that the individualism/externalism dispute which has long preoccupied philosophy of psychology is an empty one.
Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, David Hume Tower, George Square, Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JX.
I have had a lot of help with this paper. It was instigated by an objection to my “Wide Content Individualism” raised by Gabriel Segal. In addition to Gabriel, I would particularly like to thank Alexander Bird, Tom Bontly, David Buller, Peter Milne, Philip Percival, Larry Shapiro, Tim Williamson, and two very helpful anonymous referees from this journal, as well as audiences in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Mexico City, Bradford, and University College, Dublin. This paper was written partially with the support of SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship #756-94-0750.