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Adaptive Design, Contingency, and Ontological Principles for Limited Beings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Daniel S. Brooks
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Abstract

Transcendental arguments are not popular in contemporary philosophy of science. They are typically seen as antinaturalistic and incapable of providing explanatory force in accounting for natural phenomena. However, when viewed as providing (certain types of) intelligibility to complicated concepts used in scientific reasoning, a concrete and productive role is recoverable for transcendental reasoning in philosophy of science. In this article I argue that the resources, and possibly the need, for such a role are available within a thoroughly naturalistic framework garnered from the work of Hasok Chang and William Wimsatt.

Type
Realism and Epistemic Humility
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 871 - 881
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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