Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T06:18:03.315Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Daniel Steel
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how acceptance can be guided exclusively by epistemic values suffer from difficulties that do not afflict Cohen’s theory.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 818 - 828
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

This work was supported by the Intramural Research Grant Program at Michigan State University (08-IRGP-1448) during the 2009–10 academic year. I would also like to thank Kevin Elliott, David Willmes, and Heather Douglas for helpful comments and discussion.

References

Biddle, J., and Winsberg, E.. 2010. “Value Judgments in the Estimation of Uncertainty in Climate Modeling.” In New Waves in Philosophy of Science, ed. Magnus, P. D. and Busch, J., 172–97. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Bratman, M. 1999. Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, J. 1992. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Cranor, C. 1993. Regulating Toxic Substances. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cranor, C. 2006. Toxic Torts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorato, M. 2004. “Epistemic and Nonepistemic Values in Science.” In Science, Values, and Objectivity, ed. Machamer, P. and Wolters, G., 52–77. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douglas, H. 2000. “Inductive Risk and Values in Science.” Philosophy of Science 67:559–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douglas, H. 2009. Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, E. 1983. “On a Recent Theory of Rational Acceptance.” Philosophical Studies 44:331–43.Google Scholar
Elliott, K. 2011. Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Incorporating Societal Values in Environmental Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giere, Ronald. 2003. “A New Program for Philosophy of Science?” Philosophy of Science 70:15–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1983. “Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses.” Synthese 57:341–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1985. “Acceptance of Empirical Statements: A Bayesian Theory without Cognitive Utilities.” Theory and Decision 18:1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. 1991. “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment.” Philosophy of Science 58:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, R. 1956. “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.” Philosophy of Science 23:237–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, M. 1981. “A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance.” Journal of Philosophy 78:305–30.10.2307/2026127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, Philip. 2001. Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195145836.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kourany, J. 2003. “A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century.” Philosophy of Science 70:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lacey, H. 1999. Is Science Value Free? London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lacey, H. 2004. “Is There a Significant Distinction between Cognitive and Social Values?” In Science, Values, and Objectivity, ed. Machamer, P. and Wolters, G., 24–51. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. 1960. “Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?” Journal of Philosophy 57:345–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. 1962. “On the Seriousness of Mistakes.” Philosophy of Science 29:47–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. 1967. Gambling with Truth. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Levi, I. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Maher, P. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMullin, E. 1982. “Values in Science.” In Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1, ed. P. Asquith and D. Nickles, 3–28. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Mitchell, S. 2004. “The Prescribed and Proscribed Values in Science Policy.” In Science, Values, and Objectivity, ed. Machamer, P. and Wolters, G., 245–55. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Rudner, R. 1953. “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.” Philosophy of Science 20:1–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shrader-Frechette, K. 1991. Risk and Rationality. Berkeley: University of California Press.10.1525/9780520320789CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singer, P. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:229–43.Google Scholar
Steel, S. 2010. “Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk.” Philosophy of Science 77:14–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar