Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-12T21:36:48.311Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence and Criticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

A. H. Johnson
A. H. Johnson*
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.

Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , October 1945 , pp. 237 - 295
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1945

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1 During recent years several books and articles have been devoted to at least some phases of this same general project. Among these the following may be regarded as worthy of particular consideration: (In the course of this article others will also be examined.)

R. Das, The Philosophy of Whitehead; Dorothy M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism; E. J. Lintz, The Unity of the Universe According to Alfred North Whitehead; D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead; The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.); S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, July, 1941, January, 1942, November, 1943, July 1944; Jean Wahl, La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead, Revue Philosophique, Tome CXI (1931); John W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge; J. Ratner, Introduction, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant); E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930); D. C. Moxley, The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Whitehead, Aristotelian Society Proceedings (1933–4); H. S. Fries, The Function of Whitehead's God, The Monist, Vol. XLVI (1936); S. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God; B. M. Loomer, Ely on Whitehead's God, The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXIV (1944).

However, despite the value of these studies, all suffer from various deficiencies as will be indicated in the body of this article.

The following articles, which were devoted chiefly to a consideration of some of the implications and applications of Whitehead's metaphysics, have some bearing on the project involved in this article: A. H. Johnson, A Criticism of D. Bidney's “Spinoza and Whitehead“, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVII (1938); The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Vol. X (1943); The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943); “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944); Whitehead's Philosophy of History, Journal of the History of Ideas (forthcoming issue); Whitehead and the Making of To-morrow, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. V (1945); The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

2 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929, p. 4. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “P. R.“

3 P. R., p. vi.

4 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 290. Hereafter this book will be referred as “A. I.“

5 A. I., pp. 233–5.

6 P. R., p. 12 (material in brackets mine. See later, intensive, discussion of this point).

7 P. R., p. 7 (material in brackets mine).

8 P. R., p. 8.

9 P. R., p. 19 (material in brackets and emphasis mine).

10 Percy Hughes, Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate? The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 298. See also: W. H. Sheldon, America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 131; D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, pp. 100–1; 142.

11 Arthur E. Murphy, Whitehead and the Method of Speculative Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 369–70. See also p. 368 and Symposium: Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended? W. T. Stace, Ralph M. Blake, Arthur E. Murphy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII (1943), note particularly p. 138.

12 P. R., p. 25.

13 J. Ratner, Introduction, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant) pp. 230, 207–8. Hereafter this article will be designated “Ratner“.

14 Dorothy M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, p. viii. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Emmet“.

15 Victor Lowe, The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 103. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Lowe“.

16 Lowe, p. 104 (emphasis mine).

17 Lowe, pp. 104 and 103.

18 This theory of mathematics is apparently stated by Dewey. See The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), p. 174. For a brief statement of other theories of mathematics see Bertrand Russell, My Mental Development, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 12–14.

19 See P. R., pp. 12; 15–16.

20 See W. T. Stace, Critical Notice: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), Mind, Vol. LII (1943), pp. 58–9.

21 See later discussion, particularly criticism No. 3.

22 P. R., pp. 252–3. See also J. Dewey, The Philosophy of Whitehead, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 648.

23 A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Macmillan co. New York, 1926, pp. 104–5. (See also E. A. Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy, pp. 424–5.)

24 P. R., p. 427.

25 A. I., p. 237.

26 S. E. Hooper calls attention to this argument in what appears to be a quotation from Whitehead. (However, it is “unlocated” as to book and page.) Actually it is only partially a quotation. The rest is an inaccurate attempt at restatement by Hooper. See Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, July 1941, p. 296.

27 P. R., p. 268.

28 P. R., p. 178. See also P. R., p. 177, and in general, part IV of P. R. See also Hartshorne's arguments in support of Whitehead's pan-psychism in The Philosophical Review: “On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy” (July 1935); and “The Interpretation of Whitehead” (July 1939).

29 A. I., p. 111.

30 A. I., p. 198.

31 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Macmillan Co., New York, p. 268, 1931 Ed. Hereafter this book will be referred to as S. M. W.

32 A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938; pp. 25–6. Hereafter this book will be referred to as M. T.

33 A. I., p. 198.

34 Ratner, p. 64.

35 Ratner, p. 64.

36 A. I., pp. 227–8.

37 R. Das, The Philosophy of Whitehead, p. 190. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Das“.

38 Das, p. 194.

39 P. R., pp. 12 and x.

40 P. R., p. 27. It is interesting to note Hartshorne's suggestion that this statement should not be taken too seriously. He contends that “Whitehead is not essentially or without far-reaching qualifications committed to the view that occasions are more fundamental than enduring individuals (i.e., a society).” (Whitehead's idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, P. A. Schilpp, Ed., p. 547). (Material in brackets mine.) Despite the arguments which Hartshorne offers in support of his contention, Whitehead's position seems to support the quoted statement concerning the “final” reality of actual entities. (See a discussion of the meaning of the term “final” in: A. H. Johnson, The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 267.)

41 M. T., p. 228.

42 Whitehead points out that in contemporary physical science there is a strong tendency to displace the notion that ultimate reality is completely atomic—each bit of reality self-sufficient and exclusive. “The modern point of view is expressed in terms of energy, activity and the vibratory differentiations of space-time. Any local agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects are minute but they are there.—The environment enters into the nature of each thing.” (M. T., p. 188.) Thus for modern physics, a thing is not an inert mass occupying a certain definite space. A thing is what it does, a stream of influence which permeates to the utmost recesses of space-time. It is evident that when we speak of a thing being specifically located at a certain place we refer only to its focal region. Whitehead's point of view is supported by W. H. Sheldon when he remarks: “There may well be in nature, inorganic as well as living, a slow tendency to combine more and more of what seem to us now, or have seemed, to be incompatible conditions. Liquid air, fire that feeds on water, the fusing of proton and electron in the sun, offer suggestive instances. Particularly the notion of statistical laws inclines in the same direction; as if nature had an intrinsic tendency to vary in all possible ways in any given situation.” We could also point to the “Mendelian” facts of heredity where the various possible combinations of genes seem to recur. There is. then, a body of decidedly specific evidence in favor of “Whitehead's thesis of incremental process in the inorganic realm: and he might well have used more of this evidence than he did.” (America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 150.)

43 P. R., pp. 33; 113.

44 P. R., pp. 337–9.

45 P. R., p. 35.

46 P. R., p. 366.

47 P. R., p. 35.

48 P. R., pp. 68–73; 101–2.

49 P. R., p. 136; A. I., p. 297.

50 P. R., p. 321.

51 P. R., pp. 38; 129.

52 P. R., p. 35.

53 P. R., p. 32.

54 P. R., p. 29.

55 P. R., p. 32.

56 P. R., p. 70.

57 See: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 60. Also M. T., pp. 92–7. It should be noted that Whitehead also uses the term “universal” in a rather confused fashion—confusing in the sense that it is unusual: P. R., p. 76. However, it is understandable, and hardly merits Stebbings’ comment, Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930), p. 471.

58 Das, pp. 183–4.

59 S. M. W., p. 230 (material in brackets mine).

60 Das, p. 184.

61 S. M. W., pp. 230–1.

62 P. R., p. 34.

63 P. R., p. 63.

64 The platonic term “participation” is also used. “The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal“. (P. R., p. 63.) It has been claimed (see, for example, Emmet, p. 106) that Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects is very similar to Plato's theory of “ideas”. It is true that there is some similarity. Both refer to abstract entities which must be apprehended by reason. They are not objects of sensory experience. However, Whitehead stresses several fundamental differences which serve to distinguish his eternal objects from Plato's ideas. (The reference is to Plato's theory of ideas as expressed in The Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus) (a) Plato's ideas have no necessary relationship to the concrete world of actual entities. Whitehead's eternal objects are essentially related to actual entities. (b) Plato's ideas are assigned the exalted status of sole reality. For Whitehead actual entities are the ultimate realities.

65 P. R., p. 82.

66 S. M. W., p. 239.

67 P. R., p. 174.

68 S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan., 1942, p. 53. See also Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Nov., 1943, pp. 205–7.

69 See S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan. 1942, pp. 47–8.

70 R. W. Sellars, Philosophy of Organism and Physical Realism, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 411. See also p. 433.

71 See, for example, S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Vol. XVII (1942), pp. 59–62.

72 P. R., p. 446 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

73 Emmet, p. 133.

74 John Dewey, Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), pp. 175–6.

75 A. N. Whitehead, Remarks, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), p. 179.

76 P. R., p. 35. It is important to note that in formulating his theory of prehension, Whitehead acknowledges a debt to Bradley. He states “It is interesting to make a few citations from Bradley illustrating my general adherence to his doctrine of Feeling.” (A. I., p. 297.) He then proceeds to show how he accepts Bradley's analysis but prefers to use different technical terms.

77 P. R., p. 66.

78 E. J. Lintz, The Unity of the Universe According to Alfred North Whitehead, F.R.S., Sc.D., LL.D., p. 50. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Lintz“. Note: the contents of this book were published in The Thomist, Vol. VI (1943).

79 A. P. Ushenko, Negative Prehension, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIV (1937), p. 266.

80 See P. R., pp. 35; 66; 337–8. Note subsequent discussion of the distinction between initial and objective data.

81 P. R., pp. 34–5.

82 P. R., p. 66.

83 P. R., p. 38 (material in brackets mine).

84 P. R., p. 246.

85 A. I., pp. 235–6.

86 Whitehead claims that the essentials of his theory of prehension were noted but not stressed by previous thinkers. For example, Berkeley in Alciphron (fourth dialogue) has Euphanor pointing out to Alciphron: “It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, and the planet (distant in space) which are grasped into unity (by the percipient occasion) here.” S. M. W., p. 102 (material in brackets mine). Thus Whitehead seems to think that Berkeley recognizes that perception involves a transfer of content—the sort of process which Whitehead calls prehension.

87 Bertram Morris, The Art-process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 479.

88 P. R., 336.

89 P. R., p. 44 (material in brackets mine).

90 P. R., p. 364.

91 S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy: Actual Entities, Philosophy, Vol. XVI (1941), p. 297. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hooper I.” (The same mistaken notion is expressed in Das, p. 105.)

92 P. R., p. 363.

93 E. B. McGilvary, Space-Time, Simple Location, and Prehension, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 236–7.

94 P. R., p. 362 (material in brackets mine).

95 A. I., pp. 255–6, and P. R., p. 321.

96 P. R., pp. 337–8.

97 D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, p. 106. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Gentry“.

98 Gentry, p. 111.

99 The same contradictory procedure is found in E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27 (1930), pp. 32–3, contrasted with p. 35.

100 Gentry, pp. 145–6.

101 See Gentry, pp. 117, 151, 156, 168.

102 Gentry, pp. 151–3.

103 Gentry, p. 191.

104 Gentry, p. 120.

105 Gentry, p. 129.

106 See Gentry, pp. 138–9.

107 P. R., p. 38.

108 P. R. p. 66 (material in brackets mine).

109 See Gentry, pp. 163–4.

110 Gentry, p. 130.

111 Gentry, p. 121.

112 Emmet, p. 96.

113 P. R., pp. 337–8.

114 See Lintz, p. 59; Gentry, p. 189.

115 A. M. Dunham, Animism and Materialism in Whitehead's Organic Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29 (1932), p. 45.

116 W. T. Stace, Critical Notice, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), Mind, Vol. LII (1943), p. 61.

117 Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 336.

118 P. R., pp. 133–4.

119 P. R., p. 249.

120 P. R., p. 93.

121 P. R., p. 249.

122 Among those overlooking this point are: Gentry, pp. 114–15; Hooper I, p. 289; DeW. H. Parker, Substance and Experience, pp. 67–8.

123 See P. R., pp. 34, 63. It is to be noted that sometimes Whitehead uses the term realization, not in the sense of ingression, but rather in the sense of conceptual prehension. (P. R., p. 392.)

124 Gentry, p. 199 (material in brackets mine).

125 P. R., p. 343.

126 Emmet, p. 148.

127 Emmet, p. 149.

128 S. E. Hooper, Telepathy in the Light of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XLII (1944).

129 See P. R., pp. 35; 37; 338.

130 P. R., p. 286. See also: A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

131 John W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge, p. 9. See also p. 23. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Blyth“.

132 P. R., p. 37.

133 Jean Wahl, La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead, Revue Philosophique, Tome CXI, Nos. 7, 8, 1931, p. 117. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Wahl“.

134 See P. R., pp. 134; 320.

135 A. I., p. 298 (emphasis mine).

136 P. R., p. 343.

137 Mary L. Coolidge, Purposiveness Without Purpose in a New Context, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. III (1943), p. 87.

138 Gentry, p. 103.

139 P. R., p. 135; see also p. 373.

140 Percy Hughes, Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate? The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 299. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hughes“.

141 See preceding discussion of “subjective aim“.

142 P. R., p. 134.

143 Lintz, pp. 11–13.

144 P. R., p. 134.

145 Lintz, p. 13 (material in brackets mine).

146 Lintz, p. 51.

147 Lintz, p. 59.

148 Gentry, p. 157.

149 P. R., p. 202.

150 P. R., p. 135 (material in brackets mine).

151 See later discussion.

152 Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 334.

153 A. I., p. 252 (material in brackets mine).

154 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 545.

155 Charles W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 188.

156 P. R., p. 79.

157 P. R., p. 224.

158 P. R., p. 224.

159 P. R., p. 366 (emphasis mine).

160 P. R., p. 435.

161 P. R., p. 351.

162 P. R., p. 321.

163 See P. R., pp. 351–2.

164 P. R., p. 65.

165 P. R., p. 136 (material in brackets mine).

166 P. R., p. 234.

167 P. R., pp. 135–6.

168 P. R., p. 35.

169 P. R., p. 338.

170 P. R., p. 339.

171 P. R., p. 35.

172 P. R., p. 136. See also Das, p. 101; Gentry, p. 170.

173 H (1), p. 291.

174 P. R., p. 126.

175 This discussion will perhaps provide at least a partial answer for cricisms offered by Das, pp. 177–183; Lintz, pp. 10, 21; Parker, Experience and Substance, p. 19. In any case Das is obviously not correct when he attributes to Whitehead the doctrine that “an actual entity leaves no remainder when it perishes” (Das, p. 181). Further, there is the suggestion that “when an actual entity perishes, we cannot say that part of it remains to be carried over into other actual entities, because part of an actual entity, not being an actual entity itself, is nothing at all, since actual entities are the ultimate metaphysical facts” (Das, p. 180). This is fallacious because he overlooks the basic point that while actual entities are the final, real, things in the universe, their components are not, for Whitehead, “nothing at all“. They are factual components which help to constitute an actual entity.

176 A. I., pp. 250–1. Gentry makes the mistake of assuming that the envisagement of an eternal object and its use in guiding the process of concretion is the only instance of the future entering the present in a determining fashion (p. 201).

177 Whitehead uses the term “atomic” here in the sense of (co-operating) individual—not in the sense of individual with no relations to other individuals.

178 P. R., p. 71.

179 H (1), p. 291.

180 W. H. Sheldon, America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 147. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Sheldon“.

181 Sheldon, pp. 148–9.

182 Blyth, p. 17.

183 P. R., p. 380.

184 A. N. Whitehead, Time, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 61.

185 P. R., p. 517.

186 P. R., pp. 433–4.

187 P. R., p. 434.

188 P. R., p. 108.

189 P. R., p. 105.

190 P. R., p. 434.

191 P. R., p. 337.

192 P. R., pp. 184–246.

193 P. R., p. 35.

194 J. S. Bixler, Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 492.

195 W. E. Hocking, Whitehead on Mind and Nature, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 394.

196 J. Dewey, The Philosophy of Whitehead, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 657.

197 See Emmet, p. 128. See also: E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930), pp. 29–36.

198 P. R., pp. 102, 226.

199 Emmet, p. 97.

200 See P. R., p. 108.

201 Lintz, p. 55.

202 P. R., p. 521.

203 P. R., p. 134.

204 Das, p. 189.

205 P. R., pp. 522, 134.

206 S. L. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God, p. 21. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Ely“. See also S. E. Hooper, Eternal Objects and God, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan. 1942, p. 65. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Hooper (II).

207 Ely, p. 33.

208 B. M. Loonier, Ely on Whitehead's God, The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXIV (1944), p. 165. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Loomer“.

209 Loomer, p. 166.

210 P. R., p. 48. This is the so-called “ontological principle“; see P. R., p. 36.

211 P. R., pp. 374; 523.

212 S. M. W., p. 257.

213 DeW. H. Parker, Experience and Substance, p. 68.

214 P. Shorey, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 582.

215 Loomer, pp. 163–4. (Emphasis mine.)

216 P. R., p. 50.

217 P. R., pp. 525–6.

218 P. R., p. 343.

219 D. C. Moxley, The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Whitehead, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Vol. XXXIV (1933–4), p. 179. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Moxley“. See also Emmet, p. 116; D. L. Miller, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, p. 89.

220 P. R., p. 38.

221 P. R., p. 164 (material in brackets mine).

222 P. R., p. 160 (material in brackets mine). See previous discussion of this general point. Further, there may be a novel selection from available eternal objects.

223 Ely, p. 10–11 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

224 Ely, p. 21 (emphasis mine).

225 Ely, p. 29.

226 Ely, p. 30.

227 Ely, p. 32 (material in brackets mine).

228 Das, p. 187 (material in brackets mine).

229 R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 620 (material in brackets mine). Equally incorrect are Das, p. 161, and M. H. Moore, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 40; p. 270.

230 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 556. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Hartshorne.

231 E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930), p. 39. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hall“.

232 P. R., p. 70.

233 P. R., p. 70.

234 P. R., p. 521.

235 P. R., p. 344.

236 P. R., p. 382.

237 Hall, p. 37. See also G. Vlastos, Organic Categories in Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIV (1937), p. 259.

238 P. R., p. 392 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

239 Hall, p. 37 (material in brackets mine).

240 Lintz, pp. 40 and 52.

241 See P. R., p. 73.

242 Lintz, p. 39.

243 Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930).

244 See S. M. W., p. 256.

245 See Emmet, p. 250.

246 P. R., p. 47.

247 Hartshorne, p. 535 (material in brackets mine).

248 Ely, p. 56.

249 P. R., p. 134.

250 Emmet, p. 259.

251 Emmet, pp. 263; 270. See also Lintz, p. 36.

252 P. R., p. 524.

253 P. R., p. 517.

254 Whitehead's contention that God is like other actual entities is open to serious question as will be shown later in this article.

255 See P. R., p. 73.

256 Lintz, p. 33. See also Ely's excellent discussion of this point, p. 33, footnote 25, and Hartshorne p. 541, Hooper (1) p. 286.

257 Hall, p. 40 (material in brackets mine).

258 Hartshorne, pp. 519; 529. Strangely enough Hartshorne offers an interpretation of how the past may be in the present which seems to contradict his claim that “God fully possesses or prehends” every past occasion in its entirety. Hartshorne states: “But perhaps it will be thought a paradox that the past should, in present experience, be still immediately given. I have elsewhere on several occasions explained this to mean that the past involves universals of which the latter events are instances” (Hartshorne, p. 543). See also Das 166–7 and Wahl, p. 133.

259 P. R., p. 134 (emphasis mine).

260 This and a preceding reference to “God's tender care” reminds one of Whitehead's contention that the terms of religious devotion can be legitimately applied to his metaphysical God. Further illustrations of this point are noted in subsequent sections of this article.

261 P. R., p. 525. It is interesting to note that Hartshorne makes use of this quotation (Hartshorne, p. 530) without apparently realizing its full meaning.

262 P. R., p. 531.

263 P. R., pp. 524–5.

264 P. R., p. 532.

265 P. R., p. 531 (material in brackets mine). See a discussion of this point in: A. H. Johnson, “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944), pp. 23–4.

266 Hartshorne, p. 549.

267 Lintz, p. 27.

268 Lintz, p. 61.

269 Lintz, p. 16.

270 See A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

271 Loomer, p. 169.

272 Loomer, p. 167.

273 P. R., p. 531.

274 Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 343 (emphasis mine). See also Hartshorne, pp. 531–2.

275 P. R., p. 524.

276 W. G. de Burgh, Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), p. 211.

277 P. R., p. 286.

278 L. S. Stebbing, Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930), p. 475.

279 For example: “In esthetic creativity, which is for Whitehead the substantial stuff of things, eternal objects are united and particular things, creatures, emerge.” (N. P. Stallknecht, Studies In The Philosophy of Creation, p. 130)—“The primal creative cause through which all coming-to-be springs and which impels everything which has become real to ever new forms and events is called by Whitehead creativity.” (R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 619.) (La créativite) a pour attributes de donner naissance à la multiplicité des modes contingents et aux objects éternals, — Derrière le passage des événements et derrière l'eterneté des objects, nous trouverons cette énergie éternelle de réalisation. —c'est par elle que le multiple constitue un monde. Elle fait passer de la disjonction à la conjonction” (Wahl, pp. 124–5).

280 S. M. W., pp. 102–3.

281 P. R., p. 31.

282 P. R., p. 339.

283 Hooper (1), p. 290 (material in brackets mine).

284 Hooper (1), pp. 288; 297.

285 Lintz, see p. 32 and pp. 35–6.

286 Ely, see pp. 14; 17; 20 for the incorrect statements and pp. 16; 24; 46 for correct statements.

287 Emmet, p. 252.

288 Das, p. 173.

289 Moxley, p. 168.

See also W. G. deBurgh, Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), p. 210.

290 Moxley, p. 167–70.

291 Loomer, p. 165.

292 P. R., p. 521.

293 Ely, p. 14. For a more detailed discussion of this point see: A. H. Johnson, A Criticism of D. Bidney's “Spinoza and Whitehead“, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVII (1938), pp. 410–14.

294 Das, p. 161.

295 The preceding discussion provides at least a partial answer to some of the critical considerations raised by W. G. deBurgh: Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), pp. 210–11.

296 Gentry, p. 198.

297 P. R., pp. 521; 523; 528.

298 This serves to refute Ratner's contention that Whitehead “proceeds by making distinctions, and then internally involving them in each other so that at the end he has everything in everything else—which consequence also obliterates distinctions.” J. Ratner, Introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant), p. 218.

299 Lintz, p. 31 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

300 Lintz, p. 44.

301 Lintz, p. 16.

302 P. R., p. 532. To this phase of God's activity Whitehead applies the phrase, “The love of God“. He also suggests that “the kingdom of heaven is with us today.” God also is called the “fellow-sufferer who understands” (P. R., p. 532).

303 S. H. Fries, The functions of Whitehead's God, The Monist, Vol. XLVI (1936), pp. 35–6. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Fries“.

304 Loomer, p. 166. See also Fries, p. 51.

305 P. R., p. 377.

306 Fries, p. 28.

307 P. R., p. vii.

308 F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 460, Oxford University Press, 1930. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Bradley“.

309 Bradley, p. 128. See also p. 403. See also p. 432.

310 Bradley, p. 469.

311 J. E. Boodin, Fictions in Science and Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 704.

312 Wahl, pp. 133–4.

313 This phase of God's activity is, according to Whitehead, a further manifestation of divine patience (P. R., p. 525).

314 P. R., p. 12.

315 P. R., pp. 470–1 (emphasis mine).

316 A. I., pp. 258–9.

317 A. I., p. 261.

318 A. I., p. 261.

319 A. I., p. 261.

320 A. I., p. 260.

321 A. I., p. 263.

322 P. R., p. 52.

323 A. I., p. 264.

324 See P. R., p. 166 and in general the discussion of the “autonomy” of actual entities.

325 P. R., p. 116.

326 P. R., p. 516. See a more complete discussion of this topic in; A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

327 See A. I., pp. 260–1.

328 Sheldon, pp. 129–30.

329 Sheldon, p. 130.

330 Emmet, p. 186 (material in brackets mine). See also Lintz, p. 63.

331 A. E. Murphy, Symposium: Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended? The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII, (1943), p. 138 (material in brackets mine).

332 P. R., p. 103.

333 Blyth, pp. 33–4.

334 Gentry, p. 194.

335 S. M. W., p. 157. Joseph Needham: A Biologist's View of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 255–8.

336 A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 215–16.

337 See Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, Chap. 1.

338 P. R., p. 327.

339 P. R., p. 327 (emphasis mine).

340 A. I., p. 264; Modes of Thought, p. 31.

341 P. R., p. 126.

342 P. R., p. 524.

343 P. R., p. 134.

344 P. R., p. 521.

345 See C. Lloyd Morgan, Subjective Aim in Professor Whitehead's Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6 (1931), pp. 285–9. Sheldon, pp. 142–5; J. E. Boodin, Fictions in Science and Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 703–4; M. W. Gross, Book Review: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 276.

346 For other expositions of this theory see references in: A. H. Johnson, The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Vol. X (1943), pp. 52–3.

347 See Gentry, p. 176; Das, p. 185; Lintz, p. 51; and in particular, J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, Chaps. 19–20.

348 See Gentry, pp. 178–9.

349 See P. R., p. 29.

350 Here I disagree with Pratt who suggests that the self is “already real in the first conscious stirrings of the new born, or the unborn infant. “Personal Realism”, p. 298.

351 See J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 282.

352 P. R., p. 28.

353 A. H. Johnson, “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944), particularly pp. 14–15.