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The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patricia Smith Churchland*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I am especially indebted to Larry Jordan of the Physiology Department for help and advice.

References

REFERENCES

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