Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T15:56:09.012Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A Simplified Proof of an Impossibility Theorem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Alfred F. Mackay*
Affiliation:
Oberlin College

Abstract

In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority rule.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1] Arrow, K. J. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963.Google Scholar
[2] Black, D. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.Google Scholar