Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T19:52:30.753Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Representation and the Imperfect Ideal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Charles Wallis
Charles Wallis*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, 315 Dewey Hall, Rochester, NY 14627–0078, USA.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper examines the nomic covariationist strategy of using idealization to define representation. While the literature has focused upon the possibility of defining ideal conditions for perception, I argue that nomic covariationist appeals to idealization are pseudoscientific and contrary to a foundational and empirically well-supported methodological presupposition in cognitive science. Moreover, one major figure in this camp fails to come to grips with its role and its problems in mainstream science. Thus he forwards a false dichotomy of the sciences and treats idealization as a blank check written by scientists on an unknown bank. Finally, I consider and reject alternative formulations of the nomic covariationist's idealization strategy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 407 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am indebted to the Mellon Foundation, National Endowment for the Humanities, colleagues at the Universities of Rochester and Minnesota, as well as to participants in the 1992 Pacific Division APA and 1993 NEH summer seminar.

References

Churchland, P. (1979), Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625435CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cummins, R. (1989), Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. (1981), Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. (1974). “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)”, Synthese 28: 97–115.10.1007/BF00485230CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. (1986), “Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 3–23.10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00532.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. (1987), Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. (1990a), “Psychosemantics”, in Lycan, W., (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader., Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 312–337.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. (1990b), Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. (1991a), “Replies”, in Rey, G. and Loewer, B., (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics., Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 255–319.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. (1991b), “You can Fool Some of the People All the Time: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation”, Mind 100: 19–34.10.1093/mind/C.397.19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giere, R. (1988), “Laws, Theories, and Generalizations”, in Grünbaum, A. and Salmon, W., (eds.), The Limits of Deductivism., Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 37–46.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. (1988), “Provisos: A Problem Concerning the Inferential Function of Scientific Theories”, in Grünbaum, A. and Salmon, W., (eds.), The Limits of Deductivism., Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 19–36.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1973), Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. New York: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Mott, P. (1992), “Fodor and Ceteris Paribus Laws” Mind 100: 335–346.10.1093/mind/101.402.335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schiffer, S. (1991), “Ceteris Paribus Laws”, Mind 100: 1–17.10.1093/mind/C.397.1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stampe, D. (1986), “Verificationism and a Causal Account of Meaning”, Synthese 69: 107–137.10.1007/BF01988289CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallis, C. (1992). “Asymmetric Dependence and Mental Representation”, in Psycholoquy 70.Google Scholar
Wallis, C. (1993), “TII: Judgement Day”. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Wallis, C. (1994), “Ceteris Paribus Laws and Psychological Explanation”, PSA 1994. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. In press.Google Scholar