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Representation and Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Papineau
David Papineau*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
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Abstract

Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the cognitive mechanism's parts.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 1984 , pp. 550 - 572
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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