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Radical Probabilism Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Lyle Zynda
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Abstract

In this essay, I analyze and critique Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. The basic theses defining it are examined, particularly the idea that probabilistic coherence involves a kind of “consistency.” The main challenges to Jeffrey's view are (1) that there is an inconsistency between regarding probabilities as subjective and some probabilistic judgments as better than others, and (2) that decision theory so conceived has no normative import. I argue that both of these challenges can be met.

Type
In Memory of Richard Jeffrey
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 969 - 980
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank my fellow participants on the panel, Brian Skyrms and Persi Diaconis, and especially Alan Hájek, as well as the audience. It was a splendid session and an honor to participate. Also, thanks to Brad Armendt for helpful lunchtime conversation before the presentation.

References

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