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Probability and Decision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

H. E. Kyburg Jr.
H. E. Kyburg Jr.*
Affiliation:
U. of Rochester (N. Y.)
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Abstract

One hears increasingly from philosophers that statistical inference is a technical study that is well in control by statisticians and should be left to them; and one hears, increasingly, from mathematical statisticians that all this talk about interpretations of probability is so much philosophical frosting that is utterly irrelevant to the serious business of producing mathematical statistics. “The more interpretations of probability there are, the wider the scope of applications of our purely mathematical theories.” The point of this paper is to present, in detail, a situation in which an individual with given degrees of belief, given evidence, and given values, will have three different and contrary courses of action recommended to him, each according to one of the three most popular interpretations of probability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 1966 , pp. 250 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © 1966 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

∗

(The reserch on which this paper is based is a part of that done under National Science Foundation Grant GS 411).

References

[1] Kyburg, H. E., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, 1961.Google Scholar
[2] Kyburg, H. E., “Probability and Randomness,” Theoria, 1962.Google Scholar
[3] Kyburg, H. E., “Recent Work in Inductive Logic,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 1963.Google Scholar
[4] Popper, Karl, “Two Autonomous Axiom Systems for Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 6, 1955.CrossRefGoogle Scholar