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Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul M. Churchland
Paul M. Churchland*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and (3) to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 167 - 187
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Patricia Churchland, Michael Stack, Stephen Stich, Philip Kitcher, Patricia Kitcher, and two anonymous referees for useful criticism and discussion of earlier drafts.

References

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