Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
There are two distinct but related threads in this article. The first is methodological and is aimed at exploring the relative merits and faults of different operational definitions of consciousness. The second is conceptual and is aimed at understanding the prior commitments regarding the nature of conscious content that motivate these positions. I consider two distinct operationalizations: one defines consciousness in terms of dichotomous subjective reports, the other in terms of graded subjective reports. I ultimately argue that both approaches are inadequate and that a third alternative that involves integration of subjective report and task performance should be adopted.
Thanks to Edouard Machery and Mazviita Chirimuuta for their guidance and comments throughout development of this article. Thanks also to Marcus Adams, Mikio Akagi, Joseph McCaffrey, and Kenneth Schaffner for comments on previous drafts and fruitful discussions of the topic.