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On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David K. Henderson
David K. Henderson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Memphis State University
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152.
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Abstract

Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by considering concrete cases. A sufficiently detailed view of the role of psychological generalizations in interpretation allows us to find in psychological investigations instances of bootstrap testing.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 1991 , pp. 586 - 606
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author is indebted to Alexander Rosenberg, Terry Horgn, and John Tienson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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