Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T05:27:20.727Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

On Definitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Hugues Leblanc*
Affiliation:
Bryn Mawr College

Extract

Present-day logic regards definitions as syntactical devices of abbreviation. This view, summed up in the terse adage: “To define is to eliminate,” obscures the vital part played by definitions in deductive sciences. Abstract calculi, to become noetic tools, must be interpreted; so the richer the interpretation, the more efficient the tool. But most calculi are based on a restricted number of primitives; they thus embrace, at the outset, a restricted number of concepts and can be appraised through and only through the definitions they eventually yield. In a word, the richness of a calculus lies in its defining virtualities. The whole of PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA would be a futile game of chess, did it not embody all our mathematical concepts; none of these being assumed as primitive, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA owes its momentous significance to its definitions and to its definitions only.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1950

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)