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Occam’s Razor in Molecular and Systems Biology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Fridolin Gross
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Abstract

Occam’s razor refers to the idea that among competing explanations the simplest should be preferred. This principle has been understood and defended in different ways. Some systems biologists argue that traditional molecular biology is misguided because it relies on an unjustified application of Occam’s razor. I analyze which version of the principle is relevant in this context and ask whether the allegation stands up to scrutiny by looking at actual research. I defend the traditional approach by arguing that its use of Occam’s razor is innocuous and by showing that systems biology heavily relies on considerations of simplicity as well.

Type
Biological Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 1134 - 1145
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

*

To contact the author, please write to: Institute for Philosophy, University of Kassel, Nora-Platiel-Strasse 1, 34127 Kassel, Germany; e-mail: [email protected].

1.

The biologist Johnjoe McFadden defends Occam’s razor against people like Westerhoff in the same spirit, by appealing to the ability of simple models to make “sharper predictions.” See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VvpWiV3WtLQ.

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