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Observations, Theories and the Evolution of the Human Spirit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jim Bogen  and
Jim Woodward
Jim Bogen*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Field Group Pitzer College
Jim Woodward*
Affiliation:
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology
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Abstract

Standard philosophical discussions of theory-ladeness assume that observational evidence consists of perceptual outputs (or reports of such outputs) that are sentential or propositional in structure. Theory-ladeness is conceptualized as having to do with logical or semantical relationships between such outputs or reports and background theories held by observers. Using the recent debate between Fodor and Churchland as a point of departure, we propose an alternative picture in which much of what serves as evidence in science is not perceptual outputs or reports of such outputs and is not sentential in structure.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 4 , December 1992 , pp. 590 - 611
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We would like to thank Paul Churchland, Jerry Fodor, David Hilbert and especially Cliff Hooker for helpful comments and correspondence.

‡

Send reprint requests to the authors, Philosophy Field Group, Pitzer College, Claremont, CA 91711, USA.

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