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Linking Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Daniel M. Hausman
Daniel M. Hausman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA.
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Abstract

This essay defends two theses that jointly establish a link between causal and explanatory asymmetry. The first thesis is that statements specifying facts about effects, unlike statements specifying facts about causes, are not “independently variable”. The second thesis is that independent variability among purportedly explanatory factors is a necessary condition on scientific explanations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 435 - 451
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I have been working on the ideas in this essay for over a decade and have received a great deal of help from colleagues, students and members of a number of audiences. I have particularly benefited from conversations with Clark Glymour, Alexander Rosenberg, Herbert Simon, and James Woodward. My work was funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities during the summer of 1986 and by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation during the spring of 1991. Anonymous referees have also provided useful criticisms.

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