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Interventions and Counternomic Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Counternomics—counterfactuals whose antecedents run contrary to the laws of nature—are commonplace in science but have enjoyed relatively little philosophical attention. This article discusses a puzzle about our counternomic epistemology, focusing on cases in which experimental observations are used as evidence for counternomic claims. I show that these cases resist being characterized in familiar interventionist lines, and I suggest a characterization of my own.

Type
Laws and Natural Kinds
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

For comments on earlier versions of this article, I am especially thankful to Paul Humphreys and two anonymous referees. I also thank Jonathan Barker, Jim Darcy, Antonia LoLordo, Trenton Merricks, and my audience at PSA 2016.

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