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How Not to Explain the Errors of the Immune System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Melander
Peter Melander*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Umea University, Sweden
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Abstract

According to Mohan Matthen and Edwin Levy, certain immunological processes require explanations in which the immune system is attributed intentional states. This, they think, strengthens the scientific credentials of intentional psychology and undermines the position of those who argue that the scientific treatment of human action should involve the elimination of intentional description. In this paper, I argue that immunology does not and need not employ intentional explanation or description and consequently has nothing to offer those who seek to defend the scientific standing of intentional psychology by looking for other disciplines that “accommodate the intentional”.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 223 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I thank Alexander Rosenberg for advice and comments on drafts of this manuscript.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Umea University, S-901 87 Umea, Sweden.

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