Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T06:18:05.087Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Simon M. Huttegger
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004) and study their dynamical properties. My results will lend partial support to the thesis that evolution leads to communication. In general, states of partial communication may evolve with positive probability under standard evolutionary dynamics. However, unlike states of perfect communication, they are unstable relative to neutral drift.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , January 2007 , pp. 1 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Brian Skyrms for his advice and encouragement. I am also grateful to Georg Dorn, Bill Harms, Josef Hofbauer, Gerhard Jäger, Natalia Komarova, Hannes Leitgeb, Don Saari, Kevin Zollman, two anonymous referees, and the editor of Philosophy of Science for many helpful suggestions and comments. Most of this paper was written during a stay at the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California at Irvine, whose members I wish to thank for their hospitality and kindness. My research was supported by the Institut für Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungszentrum Salzburg and the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research.

References

Akin, Ethan, and Hofbauer, Josef (1982), “Recurrence of the Unfit,” Mathematical Biosciences 61:51–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, Ken, Gale, John, and Samuelson, Larry (1995), “Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,” Games and Economic Behavior 8:56–90.Google Scholar
Björnstedt, Johan, and Weibull, Jörgen (1996), “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation,” in Arrow, Kenneth J., Colombatto, Enrico, Perlman, Mark, and Schmidt, Christian (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour. New York: Macmillan, 135–171.Google Scholar
Cressman, Ross (2003), Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cubitt, Robin P., and Sugden, Robert (2003), “Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory,” Economics and Philosophy 19:175–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grim, Patrick, Kokalis, Trina, Tafti, Ali, Kilb, Nicholas, and Denis, Paul St. (2001), Making Meaning Happen. Technical Report 01-02. Stony Brook: SUNY, Stony Brook, Group for Logic and Formal Semantics.Google Scholar
Harms, William F. (2004), Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hauser, Marc D. (1997), The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, Morris W., and Smale, Stephen (1974), Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Hofbauer, Josef, and Sigmund, Karl (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, David (1739), A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon.Google Scholar
Huttegger, Simon (2007), “Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives,” Erkenntnis 66:409–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelley, Al (1967), “The Stable, Center-Stable, Center, Center-Unstable, Unstable Manifolds,” Journal of Differential Equations 3:546–570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Komarova, Natalia, and Niyogi, Partha (2004), “Optimizing the Mutual Intelligibility of Linguistic Agents in a Shared World,” Artificial Intelligence 154:1–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, John, and Harper, David (2003), Animal Signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maynard Smith, John, and Price, George (1973), “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature 146:15–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nowak, Martin A., and Krakauer, David C. (1999), “The Evolution of Language,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96:8028–8033.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Oliphant, Michael, and Batali, John (1997), “Learning and the Emergence of Coordinated Communication,” Center for Research on Language Newsletter 11. http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/amag/langev/paper/oliphant97learningAnd.html.Google Scholar
Pawlowitsch, Christina (2006), “Why Evolution Does Not Always Lead to an Optimal Signaling System.” Working paper, University of Vienna.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard V. O. (1936), “Truth by Convention,” in Lee, Otis H. (ed.), Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead. New York: Longmans, 90–124.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard V. O. (1953), “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 20–46.Google Scholar
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ([1755] 1997), Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men. Reprinted in V. Gourevitch (ed.), The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111–222.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas (1960), The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schlag, Karl (1998), “Why Imitate, and If So How? A Bounded-Rational Approach to the Multi-armed Bandit,” Journal of Economic Theory 78:130–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, Reinhard (1980), “A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Asymmetrical Animal Conflicts,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 84:93–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (1996), Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (2000), “Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models,” Philosophy of Science 67:94–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (2004), The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Adam ([1761] 2000), Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages. Reprinted in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 505–538.Google Scholar
Snowdon, Charles T. (1990), “Language Capacities of Nonhuman Animals,” Yearbook of Physical Anthropology 33:215–243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, Peter D., and Jonker, Leo (1978), “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences 40:145–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanderschraaf, Peter (1998), “Knowledge, Equilibrium and Convention,” Erkenntnis 49:337–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wärneryd, Karl (1993), “Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability,” Games and Economic Behavior 5:532–546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weibull, Jörgen (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
White, Morton (1950), “The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism,” in Hook, Sidney (ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom. New York: Dial, 316–330.Google Scholar
Young, H. Peyton (1998), Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zollman, Kevin J. S. (2005), “Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning,” Philosophy of Science 72:69–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar