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Error Probabilities in Error
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
The Bayesian theory is outlined and its status as a logic defended. In this it is contrasted with the development and extension of Neyman-Pearson methodology by Mayo in her recently published book (1996). It is shown by means of a simple counterexample that the rule of inference advocated by Mayo is actually unsound. An explanation of why error-probablities lead us to believe that they supply a sound rule is offered, followed by a discussion of two apparently powerful objections to the Bayesian theory, one concerning old evidence and the other optional stopping.
- Type
- Symposium: Philosophy of Statistics and Epistemology of Experiment: Bayesian vs. Error Statistical Approaches
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997
Footnotes
Thanks are due to Lawrence Jackson, Milo Schield, and Peter Urbach for their help, and to the British Academy for financial assistance.
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