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Discussion: Re-solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new-and-improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of irrelevant conjunction, and does so in a more general setting than past attempts. We will show how to simplify and improve upon Fitelson's solution.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Fitelson, Branden (1999), “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity”, The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity 66 (Proceedings): S362S378.Google Scholar
Fitelson, Branden (2001), Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Ph.D. Dissertation. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin—Madison.Google Scholar
Fitelson, Branden (2002), “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction”, Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction 69 (4): 611622..Google Scholar