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Discussion: Conflict and Decision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert J. Ackermann
Robert J. Ackermann*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Extract

In Howard Kahane's current reply to my previous discussion of Goodman's elimination rules, he suggests both that the notion of conflict required by the first elimination rule cannot be made clear, and that both proposed revisions of the second elimination rule are too strong [4]. These seem to me to be the points which require settlement, and I would like to discuss them in this paper.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , June 1967 , pp. 188 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Ackermann, Robert, “Projecting Unprojectibles.” Philosophy of Science 33, 1966, pp. 70–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (2nd ed.) Indianapolis, 1965.Google Scholar
[3] Kahane, Howard, “Nelson Goodman's Entrenchment Theory.” Philosophy of Science 32, 1965, pp. 377–383.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Kahane, Howard, “Reply to Ackermann.” Philosophy of Science 34, No. 2 1967, pp. 184–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar