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A Challenge to Positive Relevance Theorists: Reply to Roush

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Peter Achinstein
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Abstract

Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful.

Type
Reply
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 4 , October 2004 , pp. 521 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Achinstein, Peter (2001), The Book of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195143892.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roush, Sherrilyn (2004), “Positive Relevance Defended”, Positive Relevance Defended 71:110–116.Google Scholar