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Causal Complexity, Conditional Independence, and Downward Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

James Woodward
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Abstract

This article defends the notion of downward causation, relating it to a notion of conditional independence.

Type
Causation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 5: PSA 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II Symposia Papers , December 2020 , pp. 857 - 867
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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