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Why China's Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian Region

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 August 2005

David C. Kang
David C. Kang
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College ([email protected])
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Extract

Will China's expected emergence as the predominant state in East Asia result in hierarchy or balancing? At least three major bodies of literature predict that a rising China will be destabilizing. Realpolitik pessimists see China's rise as inherently so. John Mearsheimer writes that if China threatened to dominate the entire region, “It would be a far more dangerous place than it is now … Engagement policies and the like would not dull China's appetite for power.” Power transition theorists also see rapidly rising power as a likely cause of conflict. Robert Powell writes that, “A rapidly shifting distribution of power combined with the states' inability to commit to an agreement can lead to war.” Finally, those who focus on signaling emphasize that an authoritarian state has more difficulty in making credible statements about its intentions than a democratic state.David C. Kang is associate professor of government at Dartmouth College ([email protected]).

Type
SYMPOSIUM: TEN YEARS FROM NOW
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 2005 , pp. 551 - 554
Copyright
© 2005 American Political Science Association

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