Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T01:09:54.608Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Whither the Resource Curse?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2013

Kevin M. Morrison
Kevin M. Morrison*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

What is it about oil? Whereas one might think that countries that produce the world's energy have it good, much scholarship has come to the conclusion that countries that produce oil have it bad: they are worse off economically and politically than they would otherwise be. This counter-intuitive idea has become so widespread that the “resource curse” is often discussed in popular outlets, from Thomas Friedman to Stephen Colbert. And yet scholarship is increasingly questioning whether this curse actually exists. After several decades of research on the topic, we still do not have a clear idea what it is about oil—if anything—that causes problems.

Type
Review Essay
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 1117 - 1125
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, and Robinson, James A.. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91(5): 1369–401.Google Scholar
Al-Ubaydli, Omar, McCabe, Kevin, and Twieg, Peter. 2012. “Can More Be Less? An Experimental Test of the Resource Curse.” Unpublished manuscript: George Mason University.Google Scholar
Alexeev, Michael, and Conrad, Robert. 2009. “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(3): 586–98.Google Scholar
Andersen, Jørgen Juel, and Ross, Michael L.. Forthcoming. “The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies.Google Scholar
Arezki, Rabah, and van der Ploeg, Frederick. 2011. “Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita.” Review of Development Economics 15(3): 504–21.Google Scholar
Auty, Richard M. 1990. Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Beblawi, Hazem, and Luciani, Giacomo, eds. 1987. The Rentier State. London: Croom Helm.Google Scholar
Bhattacharyya, Sambit, and Hodler, Roland. 2009. “Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption.” European Economic Review 54: 608–21.Google Scholar
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boschini, Anne D., Pettersson, Jan, and Roine, Jesper. 2007. “Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109(3): 593–617.Google Scholar
Bridge, Gavin. 2008. “Global Production Networks and the Extractive Sector: Governing Resource-Based Development.” Journal of Economic Geography 8: 389–419.Google Scholar
Bridge, Gavin, and Le Billon, Philippe. 2013. Oil. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Brollo, Fernanda, Nannicini, Tommaso, Perotti, Roberto, and Tabellini, Guido. Forthcoming. “The Political Resource Curse.” American Economic Review.Google Scholar
Brückner, Markus. 2010. “Natural Resource Dependence, Non-Tradeables, and Economice Growth.” Journal of Comparative Economics 38(4): 461–71.Google Scholar
Brückner, Markus, and Ciccone, Antonio. 2012. “Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy.” Review of Economics and Statistics 94(2): 389–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brunnschweiler, C.N., and Bulte, E.H.. 2008. “The Natural Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55(3): 248–64.Google Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars.” Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–95.Google Scholar
Cotet, Anca M., and Tsui, Kevin K.. 2013. “Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross Country Evidence Really Show?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5(1): 49–80.Google Scholar
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
Dunning, Thad. 2008. Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Engerman, Stanley L., and Sokoloff, Kenneth L.. 1994. “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States.” NBER Historical Working Paper 66. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D.. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90.Google Scholar
Frankel, Jeffrey A. 2010. “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey.” NBER Working Paper No. 15836. Boston: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Gelb, Alan, et al. 1988. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Washington, DC: World Bank.Google Scholar
Gervasoni, Carlos. 2010. “A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces.” World Politics 62(2): 302–40.Google Scholar
Goldberg, Ellis, Wibbels, Erik, and Mvukiyehe, Eric. 2008. “Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States.” Comparative Political Studies 41(4-5): 477–514.Google Scholar
Haber, Stephen, and Menaldo, Victor. 2011. “Do Natural Resource Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review 105(1): 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hodler, Roland. 2006. “The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries.” European Economic Review 50(6): 1367–86.Google Scholar
Jensen, Nathan, and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 37(7): 816–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones Luong, Pauline, and Weinthal, Erika. 2010. Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Leite, Carlos, and Weidmann, Jens. 2002. “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth.” In Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance, ed. Abed, George T. and Gupta, Sanjeev. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.Google Scholar
Levine, Ross, and Renelt, David. 1992. “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions.” American Economic Review 82(4): 942–63.Google Scholar
Litschig, Stephan, and Morrison, Kevin M.. Forthcoming. “The Effect of Intergovernmental Grants on Education Outcomes and Poverty Reduction.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.Google Scholar
Mehlum, Halvor, Moene, Karl, and Torvik, Ragnar. 2006. “Institutions and the Resource Curse.” Economic Journal 116(January): 1–20.Google Scholar
Morrison, Kevin M. 2007. “Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization. A Best-Case Scenario.” Public Choice 131: 365–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability.” International Organization 63(Winter): 107–38.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49: 803–32.Google Scholar
Paler, Laura. Forthcoming. “Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Governments.” American Political Science Review.Google Scholar
Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael, Cheibub, José Antonio, and Limongi, Fernando. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2011. “Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy.” International Organization 65(3): 507–29.Google Scholar
Robinson, James A., Torvik, Ragner, and Verdier, Thierry. 2006. “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.” Journal of Development Economics 79(2): 447–68.Google Scholar
Ross, Michael L. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53: 325–61.Google Scholar
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M.. 1995. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” NBER Working Paper 5398. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M.. 1999. “The Big Rush: Natural Resource Booms and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 59(1): 43–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 2008. “The Perils of Unearned Income.” Journal of Politics 70(3): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Benjamin. 2004. “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999.” American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 232–46.Google Scholar
Tsui, Kevin K. 2011. “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries.” Economic Journal 121(551): 89–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodruff, Christopher. 2007. “Measuring Institutions.” In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, ed. Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Yergin, Daniel. 1991. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar