Overruled?: Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Contemporary Court–Congress Relations

Extract

Overruled?: Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Contemporary Court–Congress Relations. By Jeb Barnes. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 219p. $50.00.

Students of the interaction between the judicial and elected branches of government typically assume that each branch can understand the other's intentions and capabilities. In classic separation-of-power models, justices do not craft opinions they know will be overridden, and Congress does not pass laws likely to be struck down or interpreted in a manner hostile to Congress's interests. In reality, the assumption of complete information is tenuous: The transmission of information between the branches is less than perfect. Members of Congress lack the capacity to perfectly anticipate future judicial decisions, and courts cannot anticipate how elected officials will respond. Hence, congressional goals are regularly thwarted by the courts, and on occasion, judicial attempts at policymaking are overruled by Congress.